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DEVELOPING GOVERNMENTAL
ACCOUNTABILITY: THE ROLE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN
John Hatchard
Following the recent rapid and dramatic political changes in
many countries, there are now renewed calls for efforts to
encourage more open government. As a result, some western
governments have adopted the principle of conditionality, i.e. giving
rewards in the form of aid to democratic governments and in
recognition of any political reforms which lead to greater
accountability and democracy. The corollary is that countries
which are particularly bad cases of repression and abuses of human
rights are penalised.1 Accountability is a central feature of this
policy because arguably it leads to more open government and
makes it more difficult for governments to conceal human rights
abuses.2 This means that there is a need to implement effective
mechanisms of accountability. The aim of this article is to suggest
that, in this respect, the office of the ombudsman has a key role to
play in developing countries.3 It is argued that although there are
numerous such institutions worldwide, some common features are
necessary if they are to make an effective contribution towards
governmental accountability in such countries.
The aim of the office is well-known. It is the pursuit of
administrative justice for all citizens in a manner which is
confidential, informal, flexible and inexpensive. Thus any person
School of Law, Buckingham University.
1. See, for example, the article by the British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd,
"Promoting Good Government," in Crosbow, Autumn 1990, p. 4. The principle of linking aid
to "good government" is perhaps debatable but has been recognised by the European
community, the USA and the United Kingdom. For a full discussion sw K. Tomasevski,
"Human Rights Violations and Development Aid: From Politics Towards Policy,"
Commonwealth Secretariat, 1990.
2. See Hurd, supra note 1, at 5.
3. It should be noted that the terminology varies from country to country but for the sake
of consistency, the term "ombudsman" is used throughout this article.
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who claims to have suffered injustice at the hands of a government
official may complain to the ombudsman and ask for an
investigation into the matter. As a permanent (and often a
constitutionally established) institution, the office is potentially a
most effective investigatory body operating within - although not
being a part of - government. This is because wide-ranging
investigative powers give the office unique access to government
documents and officials, including the right to compel officials to
testify before it and to produce relevant documentation. In
addition, the development of personal contacts with high-ranking
government officials can often swiftly resolve a complaint whilst
officials are frequently extremely cooperative once they realise that
the office is also an important protection for them against
unfounded, malicious or unfair attacks. Further, the office enables
members of the public to identify with a known individual who (it
is hoped) retains their confidence, is impartial and able to
investigate their complaints fully.
Although originating in Sweden in 1805, the office only
became of international importance in the 1960s. It has proved
extremely adaptable and now operates in both developed and
developing nations, in multi-party and one-party states and in
states governed by military juntas.' In recommending its
establishment in Tanzania in 1965, the Presidential Commission on
the Establishment of a One-Party State highlighted the importance
of such an institution for developing countries:
In a rapidly developing country it is inevitable that many officials,
both of Government and of the ruling party, [are] authorised to
exercise wide discretionary powers. Decisions taken by such officials
can, however, have the most serious consequences for the individual,
and the Commission is aware that there is already a good deal of
public concern about the danger of abuse of power. We have,
4. Thus indicating that the ombudsman can adapt to life in developing countries, see the
discussion on this point in N. Abedin, "Transplantation of the Ombudsman Institution in
Developed and Developing Countries" (1986) Commonwealth Journal of InternationalAffairs
300, especially at 341 d. seq.
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therefore, given careful thought to the possibility of providing some
safeguards for the ordinary citizen ....
The result was the establishment of the Permanent
Commission of Enquiry in 1966. 5 It should be added that the
importance of the office is further enhanced in view of the failure
of the "traditional" organs of governmental accountability in many
developing nations to provide effective protection for the citizen.
Given the unique advantages of the ombudsman concept the
possibility of developing an effective model is extremely attractive.
Its premise is that the office of the ombudsman can help "to
ensure that the citizen receives just treatment from Government
by guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law and [by] fostering
human rights." Ideally it should form an integral part of a
constitutional framework designed to promote effective
government accountability and should fulfill the following four key
requirements.
I. An Adequate Jurisdiction
Traditionally, the ombudsman concept is limited to assisting
complainants in cases of alleged "maladministration." These cover
matters such as favouritism, tribalism, harshness, misleading a
member of the public as to his rights, failing to give reasons when
under a duty to do so, using powers for the wrong purposes, failing
to reply to correspondence or causing unreasonable delay in doing
desired public acts." However, as an integral part of the effort to
protect citizens from all governmental abuses of power, it is
necessary to expand the jurisdiction to include investigations across
a wider range of issues.
5. See general/y P.M. Norton, "The Tanzanian Ombudsman," (1973) 22 International &
Comparative Law Quarterly 603-631.
6. See General Information on the Office of the Inspector-General of Government,
Government Printer, Uganda, 1989, p. 4.
7. See, for example, the definition of the then-Investigator-General in Zambia in J.
Hatchard, "The Institution of the Ombudsman in Africa with Special Reference to Zimbabwe"
(1986) 35 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 255 at p. 266.
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A. Alleged Human Rights Violations
The scope of the investigative power envisaged here is well
illustrated by the case of Uganda. There the Inspector-General of
Government may conduct an inquiry or order an investigation into
any allegation of a violation of human rights, and this includes the
power to investigate cases of detention or torture. Similarly in
Namibia the ombudsman has the duty to investigate complaints
from any inhabitant of Namibia concerning violations of
fundamental rights by government officials (both national and
local).' It is significant that both offices may investigate the very
evils and abuses which have plagued the countries for so long.
Such a jurisdiction is crucial because the investigation of
human rights violations is notoriously difficult given the penchant
for governments to keep such matters veiled in secrecy. The point
is neatly illustrated by the Zimbabwean case of Tshuma.' Here
relatives sought information concerning the whereabouts of nine
men who were allegedly abducted by members of the security
forces in Matabeleland three years earlier and never seen again.
The High Court was unable to assist when the police denied all
knowledge of the incident. The relatives were thus unable to
discover the fate of the men. An investigation by the ombudsman
into the activities of the security forces on that occasion, including
interviews with officers and access to relevant documentation,
might have assisted the relatives by, at the very least, determining
whether security personnel were involved in the incident. In
practice, the effectiveness of this jurisdiction depends upon the
power to investigate the activities of all government officials and,
in particular, members of the defence and police forces. Such
forces are frequently responsible for some of the worst human
rights violations and are often not within the jurisdiction of the
ombudsman for "security reasons."
8. The only "officials" specifically excluded are judges and judicial officers. Does this
mean the ombudsman can investigate a complaint against the President or Prime Minister?
9. High Court of Zimbabwe, 1987 (Unreported).
218
DEVELOPING GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTABILITY 219
Of course, the expansion of the office into this field does not
(and must not) exclude or diminish the operation of non-
governmental human rights agencies. Both bodies can undertake
meaningful investigations into alleged human rights abuses using
their different modus operandi, although there is no doubt that the
access of the ombudsman to government documentation and
personnel can play a decisive role in determining the truth of the
matter. The perceived need for an "independent" body to
investigate such matters is perhaps overstated.10 Certainly the
ombudsman must fulfill certain criteria if the office is to be
credible (see below). If this is done, then impartial and effective
investigations can result.
B. Investigating Corrupt Practices
Many developing countries face serious problems of corruption
on the part of government officials, particularly bribery and misuse
of office to serve personal interests."1 In practice such activities
hinder development and victimize persons both individually and
collectively. The seriousness of the problem has also led the
United Nations Economic and Social Council to seek
administrative and regulatory mechanisms designed to eliminate
such practices.12 One such mechanism is to make use of the
ombudsman. The advantage of using the office of the ombudsman
here is that as a high profile national institution it is potentially
better able to resist improper pressure from the executive than
other bodies and is thus better equipped to undertake meaningful
investigations. Operationally, it can perform an auditing function
thereby stimulating and making use of the flow of information that
10. Cf. the argument put forward by Richard Carver in "Called to Account: How African
Governments Investigate Human Rights Violations" [1989] African Affairs 391.
11. See, for example, the National Resistance Movement 10-Point Plan: Point No. 7
(Uganda).
12. See the document prepared by the Secretariat for the Eighth United Nations Congress
on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders held in Havana, Cuba in
August/September 1990: Practical Measures Against Corruption, Document A/CONF. 144/8 at
p. 4.
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is essential to identifying and combatting dishonesty in
government. In addition, as well as being a screening point for
complaints, its prestige and reputation for objectivity make it an
obvious point of contact for the reporting of wrongdoing by
government officials. The confidentiality of its procedures gives
the office an added advantage, particularly as this assists in
countering possible intimidation of informants and complainants.
In terms of cost effectiveness it is also preferable to have a single
office rather than a separate anti-corruption body. In addition,
some investigations are inevitably interrelated so that a unified
investigatory procedure is arguably more convenient, efficient and
time-saving.13
One argument against the operation of the ombudsman in this
field is that the scope and complexity of such investigations require
the establishment of a special body which has the sole task of
investigating and prosecuting corrupt practices. Indeed in some
countries, such as Zambia and Nigeria, anti-corruption
commissions operate independently of the office of the
ombudsman. Even so, it is essential that the terrible scourge of
corruption is tackled using every possible mechanism and in this
respect the contribution of the ombudsman is potentially highly
significant. Indeed, several countries, including Papua New
Guinea, India and Nigeria already provide for jurisdiction for the
office in this area. All have reported some success in relevant
investigations and this should encourage other countries to follow
suit.14
A further argument against this jurisdiction is that allegations
of corrupt practices (and human rights abuses) are better
investigated by ad hoc commissions of enquiry which are set up by
the head of state. Certainly, on some occasions, such commissions
13. Of course the office is not involved in bringing criminal prosecutions, unlike many
anti-corruption commissions.
14. In Uganda the Inspector-General of Government has regularly investigated and
reported on instances of corruption by government officials, including members of the
National Resistance Army. The President has acted on such reports by disciplining members
of the NRA and, on one occasion, by radically reshuffling the NRA leadership. See Africa
Confidential, Vol. 30, No. 25 and Vol. 31, No. 19.
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have performed a useful function. For example, in 1989 in
Zimbabwe, President Mugabe appointed the highly publicised
Sandura Commission. Its investigations exposed instances of
corrupt practices on the part of several senior government figures
and led to some Ministers resigning and others being fired by the
President. However, in general such commissions achieve little,
frequently suffering from delays, political interference and the like.
Indeed it is asserted that often "the importance of enquiries is
lessened by the fact that recommendations can be and are easily
ignored .... Indeed such enquiries are launched only when the
administration so desires and ordains."' 5 Certainly the impact of
the Sandura Commission in Zimbabwe was greatly undermined
when a senior minister, imprisoned as a result of the enquiry, was
immediately granted a free pardon by the President. As a result,
the Attorney-General decided not to pursue criminal prosecutions
against other ministers implicated in the scandal. 6 A further
handicap for such commissions is that the normal rules of evidence
are often invoked, thus making a judicial determination of the
matter more difficult. In the circumstances, such commissions are
not a realistic alternative to investigations by the ombudsman.
C. Independent Investigations and a Legal Advice Function
In many developing countries the majority of the population
remain generally ignorant of their legal rights and consequently
extremely susceptible to governmental abuses of power.17 One
potentially effective means of protecting such individuals is to
provide the ombudsman with a power to undertake independent
15. G.K. Rukwaro, "The Case for an Ombudsman in Kenya" (1973) 9 East African Law
Journal 43, 50.
16. See also the Miller Commission in Kenya which found that a senior government
minister, Charles Njonjo, had misused his position as a public officer. However a pardon was
later granted and no prosecution ever took place. See the discussion in J.B. Ojwang,
Constitutional Development in Kenya, ACTS Press, 1990, p. 187.
17. See, for example, the Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the
Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, United
Nations Document E/AC.57/1990/3, 15 December 1989 11 5-6.
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investigations on his or her own initiative. As the Inspector-
General of Government (IGG) in Uganda has noted, "the
Inspectorate does not just wait for complaints to be brought to it,
but it also goes out to unearth corruption and maladministration
whether the public complains or not." 8 Such a jurisdiction is
especially important in cases where urgent action is required, for
it is clearly unacceptable to predicate action solely upon the
receiving of a complaint from a citizen. This is particularly so
when transportation and communication problems often make it
impossible for a citizen to contact the office in order to lodge an
urgent complaint.
Equally pressing is the problem of lack of access to justice for
the many indigent people in developing countries. Despite
knowledge about a legal right, the complexity of the legal process,
the absence of effective legal aid schemes and/or the non-
availability of lawyers invariably prevents the majority of citizens
from enforcing their legal rights. This is particularly serious as
regards the protection of human rights, for it is clear that these are
only of any real value if they are enforceable in practice. It is
recognised in both Namibia and Uganda, for example, that the
ombudsman has a key role to play here. In the former, the
ombudsman may provide legal assistance or advice to those
seeking to enforce or protect a fundamental right through the
courts. 9 In the latter, it is considered that because legal
procedures are frequently lengthy, complex and expensive, the law
courts are not always a suitable venue for many complainants to
bring their cases. Accordingly, the IGG may investigate
complaints despite the availability of a judicial remedy. To give
the ombudsman a responsibility in this field is both imaginative
and appealing. A legal assistance and advice function is certainly
not a substitute for a more formal legal aid scheme, but it does
represent a practical interim solution for dealing with the problems
of access to justice.
18. General Information on the Office of the Inspector-General of Government, supra note
6, at 7.
19. Article 25(2) Namibian Constitution.
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D. Environmental Issues
Developing nations continue to face severe environmental
problems caused by the dumping of hazardous waste, over-
exploitation of land, deforestation and the like. In Namibia, there
was particular concern over the over-exploitation of natural
resources during the colonial period. In an attempt to prevent this
recurring, the ombudsman has the duty to investigate complaints
concerning environmental issues, including "the over-utilization of
living natural resources, the irrational exploitation of non-
renewable resources, the destruction of ecosystems and the failure
to protect the beauty and character of Namibia."'2 Investigations
apparently are not limited to government activities and this gives
the ombudsman wide-ranging investigative powers into an area of
growing importance. Coupled with the enhanced remedial
procedures enjoyed by the ombudsman (see below), this represents
an important extension of the work of the office and is one which
is worthy of consideration in other jurisdictions.
E. Who May Complain?
In view of the scope of the jurisdiction, the question of who
may complain to the ombudsman becomes relevant because, at
present, it is generally assumed that the aggrieved citizen must be
the actual complainant. However, this is not always appropriate
because some cases may involve a particular group of people or
even a whole community - for example, as regards environmental
issues. In addition, it may not be possible to establish damage or
prejudice to any particular individual. Similarly, in detention cases,
it may be impossible for the detainee to contact the ombudsman.
Thus a flexible approach to the issue of who may complain is
clearly needed.
20. Article 91(d) Namibian Constitution.
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F. Overview
The precise scope of the jurisdiction will inevitably vary from
country to country. However, the real significance of the
enhanced jurisdiction is that it emphasises that the ombudsman is
not necessarily limited to the traditional functions. In addition,
the office is not restricted to investigating residual matters, i.e.
only cases where no other appropriate remedies are available.21
It is a highly flexible institution with unique advantages over other
organs of government accountability. Thus it offers a practical
means of offering protection for citizens at all levels.
The proposed model will continue to benefit those who are
victims of incompetent and thoughtless officials. However, it will
also permit investigations into deliberate abuses of power and the
like by officials, including those at the highest echelons of
government. This could well lead to government attempts to
control the office by political means such as refusing to implement
recommendations, pressurising the ombudsman into complying
with presidential wishes, or simply appointing a pro-executive
individual. Continuing reports of harassment of lawyers indicate
how difficult it is to undertake investigations into sensitive human
rights issues.' This means that any enhanced jurisdiction
requires the implementation of effective safeguards for the
operation of the office. These are now examined.
II. Effective Remedial Procedures
Traditionally, the ombudsman concept does not involve the
exercise of any judicial or quasi-judicial function, for the
incumbent has no enforcement powers and can only make
21. Cf. the traditional view of Sir Guy Powles in "Citizen's Hope: Ombudsmen for the
1980s" (1979) 5 Commonwealth Law Bulletin 522.
22. See especially Bulletin No. 23, Centre for the Independence of Judges and Lawyers
Bulletin. Protection for lawyers is now enshrined in the United Nations' Basic Principles on
the Role of Lawyers which was adopted at the Eighth United Nations Congress on the
Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders in 1990.
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recommendations to rectify an injustice. Typically, in developing
countries, if a complaint is not informally resolved after an
investigation, any recommendation by the ombudsman for action
is passed to the head of state who determines the appropriate
action. This is frequently a time-consuming, cumbersome and
unsatisfactory process.2' A true guardian of citizens' rights needs
adequate powers in order to seek an appropriate and speedy
remedy for breaches of those rights. In other words, the ability to
take "effective" action is the key to the success of the new model.
This is recognised, for instance, in Namibia where the ombudsman
has the "duty and power to take appropriate action to call for the
remedying, correction and reversal of instances specified in the
preceding sub-articles ["maladministration," abuse of power, etc.]
through such means as are fair, proper and effective. '"2' This
means that as well as the usual power to make recommendations
for action, the Namibian ombudsman may also take direct action
by bringing proceedings for an interdict or other suitable remedy
"to secure the termination of the offending action or conduct or
the abandonment or alteration of the offending procedures."' 5
This means, for instance, that the ombudsman can afford citizens
direct, speedy and effective protection from abuses of power by
intransigent government officials. This is especially significant in
cases requiring urgent action and complements the independent
investigatory power. In addition the ombudsman may challenge
the validity of any statutory provision if the offending action or
conduct "is sought to be justified by subordinate legislation or
regulation which is grossly unreasonable or otherwise ultra
vires."'  This power represents another major advance as it
means that subordinate legislation becomes subject to critical
review. In view of the limited scrutinising role played by the
legislatures in many developing nations and the proliferation of
subordinate legislation, such a jurisdiction could well transform the
23. See Hatchard supra note 7, at 258.
24. Article 91(e) Namibian Constitution.
25. Article 91(e)(dd) Namibian Constitution.
26. Article 91(e)(ee) Namibian Constitution.
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manner in which such regulations are used or abused.7 The
wide-ranging investigations of the ombudsman may also uncover
criminal conduct on the part of some government officials. In
such circumstances the Namibian ombudsman may refer the
matter to the Prosecutor-General with a view to prosecuting the
offender(s). This is an unusual power and is significant because,
in theory at least, officials, including senior government figures,
could face criminal proceedings without the need to obtain
presidential approval.2 Such a power is welcome in that it gives
the office an important new weapon when tackling abuses of
power. It remains unclear as to whether such a reference will be
made public. Although confidentiality of proceedings and
anonymity of the parties is traditionally one of the strengths of the
office, the value of the reference procedure is certainly enhanced
by an announcement of the fact accompanied by full details. This
also has the benefit of making a presidential intervention in the
matter politically more difficult."
These remedial procedures go well beyond those available to
the "traditional" ombudsman. They are perhaps controversial in
that they circumvent the role of the president (or the legislature)
who has, hitherto, normally controlled the outcome of cases.
However, the new procedures are a necessary corollary to the
enhanced jurisdiction of the ombudsman. The aim is not the
replacement of the presidential role - for this will remain relevant
and appropriate in many cases - but the provision of realistic
alternative procedures aimed at the more effective and efficient
27. In Nigeria the Public Complaints Commissioner may refer cases to the Supreme
Military Council for action where it is felt that the existing laws or administrative regulations
are inadequate. See Decree No. 31 of 1975 as amended by Decree No. 21 of 1979.
28. In Nigeria the Public Complaints Commissioner may recommend that a person be
prosecuted if it is discovered that a crime has been committed or where the conduct of a
person should be subject to disciplinary action. Decree No. 31 of 1975 as amended by Decree
No. 21 of 1979.
29. Remarkably, the Namibian Ombudsman also incorporates a quasi-law reform
commission role function in that he or she may review pre-independence laws in order to
determine whether they violate the letter or spirit of the Constitution and to make
consequential recommendations to the President, the Cabinet or Attorney-General for
appropriate action following thereupon. Article 91(e)(ff) Namibian Constitution.
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protection of the rights of citizens. In this respect, they deserve
adoption. Even in those jurisdictions where only the "traditional"
jurisdiction is retained, the development of new remedial
procedures will also enhance the effectiveness of the ombudsman.
III. An Independent Appointment System
In many developing countries the ombudsman is a purely
presidential appointee. While the endorsement of the head of
state is important, there is a danger that the work of the office will
be undermined by the appointment of a pro-executive incumbent
(or one perceived as such),30 Thus there is a need to establish an
independent appointment system. Two possible approaches merit
attention. The first is to establish an independent Ombudsman
Appointments Committee or the like which would include, for
example, representatives from human rights organisations and
consumer bodies, opposition political parties (if any) and senior
civil servants. This is the practice in, for example, Papua New
Guinea.3' An alternative approach is to base the appointment on
the recommendation of a Judicial Service Commission consisting
of, among others, senior judges and legal practitioners.32
Whichever choice is made, the presence of a formal appointment
body with a membership which includes "independent" persons
represents the best hope of obtaining a demonstrably impartial
appointee.
30. This is also done by creating a multi-member body: see Hatchard, supra note, 6 at
259.
31. Here the committee consists of the Prime Minister, Chief Justice; Leader of the
Opposition; Chairman of the appropriate Permanent Parliamentary Committee and the
Chairman of the Public Services Commission. The head of state must act in accordance with
the advice of the committee: See Section 217, Constitution of the Independent State of Papua
New Guinea. I am indebted to Mrs. P.S. Kibikibi of the Ombudsman Commission of Papua
New Guinea for this information.
32. This would mean the revamping or reintroduction of such a body in many countries
for Judicial Service Commissions, which were frequently introduced at independence, having
either been abolished or turned into purely executive-controlled bodies.
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A related issue concerns qualifications for appointment to the
office. Many states require the incumbent to hold legal
qualifications. In reality, this is unnecessary for so long as the
necessary expertise is readily available, the crucial issue is not what
the ombudsman is but who he or she is. This view is reflected in,
for example, Papua New Guinea where the Chief Ombudsman
must be a person of integrity, independence of mind, resolution
and high standing in the community."
IV. Satisfactory Conditions of Service
An ombudsman may remain prone to executive pressure unless
his or her appointment is accompanied by satisfactory conditions
of service. Ideally, these should be similar to those of members of
the judiciary with the incumbent enjoying security of tenure and
the like. In practice most ombudsmen are short-term appointees.
This constant change of office-holder potentially undermines the
effectiveness of the office by ensuring that the incumbent never
becomes too "effective" or popular?4 There is thus a need to
establish a more permanent position such that an able individual
can pursue a career in this field and develop a meaningful
institution. The mechanism may vary from country to country
although the approach in Papua New Guinea and Namibia, where
the conditions of service are virtually identical to those of judges,
is probably the most satisfactory.3"
It follows that the removal from office of the ombudsman is
not a matter for the exercise of independent presidential action.
Ideally, the recommendation should come from the same body
33. See section 4(1) Organic Law on the Ombudsman Commission. Provision is also
made for one of his immediate subordinates to have professional accountancy qualifications
and the other to have appropriate legal or administrative experience.
34. Perhaps there is also a fear that the ombudsman might pose a political threat to the
government. His or her knowledge of the working of government through access to officials
and sensitive official documents would be of considerable use to political opponents.
35. This includes the provision that the ombudsman shall hold office until the age of sixty-
five years. Indeed, the President may extend the retirement age to seventy: Article 90(2)
Namibian Constitution.
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which recommended the appointment after a full enquiry. As in
the case of members of the judiciary, the only grounds for
recommending removal should be either mental incapacity or gross
misconduct.
Conclusion
Pressure of space prevents a fuller analysis of the issues here.
However, the ombudsman model propounded here holds out the
promise of an institution which will be in the forefront of efforts
to effect meaningful government accountability in developing
nations. The acid test is whether citizens, either individually or
collectively, are afforded effective protection in practice. There is
no doubt that many countries view the ombudsman concept with
considerable suspicion both because of the sensitive nature of the
investigations and the potentially politically damaging
repercussions of the findings. Often this has led to governments
paying mere "lip-service" to the concept, while others have simply
declined to introduce it. This is regrettable. It is hoped that the
fact that countries such as Uganda and Namibia - both with
previously very poor human rights records - have moved toward
the new model will encourage and persuade others to establish the
ombudsman along these lines.
The resource implications of the model are formidable, for it
is essential that the office is provided with a well-trained and
experienced staff backed up by adequate resources. Regrettably,
in many countries, the effectiveness of the present office is severely
hampered by limited resources. Thus, it will take both
considerable time and effort and clear government support to
implement the model. Thus, in the short term it is perhaps
unrealistic to expect spectacular results. However, its advantages
are so considerable that the operation of even a limited model at
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the outset should lead to the office of ombudsman making an
immediate contribution to effective government accountability.'
36. For example, in Uganda the IGG has been effective in dealing with cases of unlawful
detention in Kampala. However, he has failed to investigate alleged political killings by the
army upcountry. It is not clear as to whether this is due to lack of resources or lack of will.
See Carver supra note 10, at 404-405.
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